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pr;c/uv'{ DEVELOPMENTS

In Re Victor B.:
JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
ADJUDICATION
ISA CIVIL
PROCEEDING
TO WHICH
CRIMINAL RULES
OF PROCEDURE
ARE INAPPLICABLE.

The distinct and separate court system established to
provide a simplified, informal
setting in which to treat juvenile
offenders was preserved by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
in In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85,
646 A.2d 1012 (1994). The
court held that juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and are
strictly governed by their own
set ofprocedural rules contained
in Chapter 900 of the Maryland
Rules, and where silent, not subject to appendage from the criminal procedural rules from Title
4 of the Maryland Rules. In so
ruling, the court vacated a finding of delinquency and remanded the case after the juvenile
court had overruled appellant's
objections to the admission of
evidence, merely because the
appellant had not filed a preadjudicatory motion to suppress
as required in criminal proceedings by Maryland Rule 4-252.
On September 16, 1992,
appellant, a juvenile, was observed by police placing a brown
paper bag on a Baltimore City
street. After a police search of
the bag revealed a substantial
amount of cocaine, police took
appellant into custody. Later,
the State filed a delinquency
petition against the appellant alleging one count of possession
of cocaine and one count of
possession of cocaine with the
intent to manufacture and distribute.
At an adjudicatory hearing before a Master for the Division for Juvenile Causes for
the Circuit Court of Baltimore
City, the appellant objected to

the introduction of evidence regarding the paper bag and its
contents, claiming that the bag
belonged to him and had not
been abandoned. This objection was overruled by the Master, who reasoned that because
Chapter 900 of the Maryland
Rules was silent as to suppression of evidence in juvenile proceedings, rules ofprocedure regulating suppression of evidence
in criminal trials were applicable to juvenile proceedings as
gap-fillers. Therefore, the
Master concluded that the appellant had waived the evidence
admissibility issue by failing to
make a pre-hearing motion to
suppress as required by Maryland Rule 4-252.
Appellant was subsequently found delinquent on the
count of possession with intent
to manufacture and distribute.
Despite the appellant's filing of
a timely exception to the Master's recommendations, the circuit court refused to disturb the
Master's findings. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari,
prior to review by the court of
special appeals, in order to consider appellant's contention.
On appeal, appellant argued that as Chapter 900 of the
Maryland Rules ofProcedure is
the exclusive source for procedural rules in juvenile proceedings, it was error for the juvenile
court to import Maryland Rule
4-252 into a delinquency adjudication. Appellant further asserted that criminal rules ofprocedure under Title 4 can never
apply to juvenile proceedings
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which are civil in nature. The
State countered that the Master
could only look to Title 4 for
guidance due to the complete
absence from Chapter 900 of
any juvenile rules dealing with
procedures for suppression.
The Court ofAppeals of
Maryland began its analysis by
tracing the historical evolution
ofthe juvenile justice system. It
noted thatthe common law treatment of juveniles over the age
of seven as adults had disappeared in light of the recognition that juveniles were better
served by rehabilitation and protection rather than punishment
by imprisonment. In re Victor
B., 336 Md. at 90, 646 A.2d at
1014. This change was carried
out by jurisdictions, exercising
their power of parens patriae,
by creation of a separate court
system for juvenile offenders in
order to provide relaxed, nonadversarial adjudicatory hearings which are civil in nature and
deemed more suitable for rehabilitative purposes than criminal
trials. Id Maryland established
its separate juvenile court system through the enactment of
the Juvenile Causes Act (Cts. &
Jud. Proc. §§ 3-801-837 (1989
Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1993)). Id
at 91,646 A.2d 1014-15.
The court recognized
that despite the intentions behind the formation of separate
juvenile court systems, delinquency adjudications over the
years often "took on . . . many
ofthe attributes of junior varsity criminal trials . . . with increasinglypenalovertones." Id
at 92,646 A.2d at 1015 (quot-

--

ing In re Devon T., 85Md.App.
674 at 682-84, 584 A.2d 1287
at 1291 (1991)). This trend led
many courts, including the Supreme Court, to afford many of
the constitutional safeguards
guaranteed criminal defendants
to juveniles charged with delinquency. Id at 91-92, 646 A.2d
at 1015. Despite these changes,
the court of appeals stressed
that Maryland case law, consistent with the purposes statement enunciated in section 3802(a)(1-5) of the Juvenile
Causes Act, in no way indicates
that adjudications in Maryland's
juvenile court system have been
transformed from civil to criminal in nature. Id at 93-94,646
A.2d at 1016.
After examining the
background of the juvenile justice system, the court determined
that the criminal rules of procedure under Title 4 of the Maryland Rules are inapplicable to
juvenile proceedings. In reaching this holding, the court first
noted that Maryland Rule I101, which outlines the applicability of the rules, states that
Title 2 applies to all civil matters
with the exception of juvenile
proceedings whose procedure
is regulated by Rules 901
through 922. Id at 94-95,646
A.2d at 1016. In addition, Rule
1-10 1 limits Title 4' s applicability to "criminal matters." Id
Moreover, the court observed
that Maryland Rule 4-101 dictates that "the rules in ... Title
[4] govern procedure in all criminal matters .... " Id at 95,646
A.2d at 1016. Next, the court
recognized that the plain mean-

ing of Rule 1-101, while solely
excluding juvenile causes from
Title 2' s civil rules, did not implicitly indicate that criminal
rules under Title 4 could not be
excluded from filling in gaps in
Chapter 900's coverage of juvenile procedural rules. Id at
95,646 A.2d at 1017.
Basing its conclusion on
the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 1-101 and Rule
4-101, the court found that neither rule expressly provided that
Title 4 applied to juvenile proceedings. Id The court emphasized that because juvenile proceedings are not criminal, there
was no reason for the legislature
to expressly exclude juvenile
proceedings from Title 4's
reach. Id Conversely, because
juvenile proceedings are civil in
nature, the court stressed that it
was essential for the legislature
to expressly exclude juvenile
proceedings from Title 2's civil
rules in order for Chapter 900 to
solely control procedure in juvenile proceedings. Id The
court further noted that its decision was in harmony with courts
from other jurisdictions which
have in kind shielded their juvenile proceedings from the application of criminal procedural
rules. Id at 96, 646 A.2d at
1017.
In Victor B., the court
refused to allow further blurring
of the delineations between the
juvenile and criminal court systems by allowing criminal rules
of procedure to have a bearing
on delinquency adjudications.
The court was justified in so
holding for ifoften complex and

technical rules of criminal procedure were to be introduced to
the juvenile court system, the
purpose behind the creation of

Wadlow v. State:
PROSECUTION
IS REQUIRED TO
PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE
DOUBT SPECIFIC
FACTORS
NECESSARY FOR
IMPOSITION
OF ENHANCED
SENTENCE.

the juvenile court system in providing a simplified, informal setting in which to better effectuate the rehabilitation and treat-

ment of juveniles would be circumvented and thwarted.
- Timothy Sean Daugherty

In Wadlow v. State, 335
Md. 122, 642 A.2d 213 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland formally classified enhanced
sentencing requirements as elements of offenses which must
be alleged and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The State cannot rely on
the discretion of the trial court
to conclude that the aggravating factors or quantity necessary to elevate a particular offense have been resolved. Following Wadlow v. State, such a
conclusion may not be reached
by the sentencingjudge, but must
be determined by the trier of
fact.
Lauren Marie Wadlow
was indicted by a Montgomery
County Grand Jury for unlawful
possession with intent to distribute (Count I), simple possession (Count II), and conspiracyto distribute cocaine (Count
III). The charging documents
alleged possession of a certain

quantity of cocaine sufficient to
subject Wadlow to an enhanced
statutory penalty for the possession with intent to distribute
charge. At trial in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, however, the jury had not
been instructed to determine the
exact quantity of cocaine that
the Defendant had possessed
for enhancement purposes.
Nevertheless, the jury found
Wadlow guilty of all three
counts. At sentencing, the simple possession count was
merged into possession with intent to distribute. Wadlow was
then given a four year sentence
for possession with intent to
distribute and a consecutive oneyear sentence for the conspiracy
charge.
At the conclusion ofthe
jury trial, the State filed a motion seeking to correct an illegal
sentence, arguing that the quantity of cocaine seized mandated
imposition of a five year, no

